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 Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis 
 Experimental Philosophy’s Place under the Sun 
 Uriah  Kriegel 
 Introduction 
 What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental 
philosophy? Th is paper starts from the contention that common answers to 
this question are implausible ( section 1 ). It then develops a framework within 
which experimental philosophy fulfi lls a specifi c function in an otherwise 
traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. Th e framework rests on two 
principal ideas. Th e fi rst is Frank Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis is 
unavoidable in “serious metaphysics” ( section 2 ). Th e second is that the psy-
chological structure of concepts is extremely intricate, much more so than 
early practitioners of conceptual analysis had realized ( section 3 ). Th is intri-
cacy has implications for the activity of analyzing concepts:  while the cen-
tral, coarser, more prominent contours of a concept may be identifi ed from 
the armchair, the fi ner details of the concept’s structure require experimental 
methods to detect ( section 4 ). 
 1.  Th e obscure rationale of experimental 
philosophy 
 In this section, I raise a question regarding the rationale for experimental philos-
ophy ( section 1.1 ) and argue that the most natural takes on what that rationale 
is do not withstand scrutiny ( section 1.2 ). 
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 1.1  Knobe and Gettier 
 Perhaps the best- known experimental philosophy study is Knobe ( 2003 ). Knobe 
presented seventy- eight random subjects (non- philosophers spending time in a 
Manhattan park) with one of two vignettes. Th e fi rst involved a person’s aware-
ness of her actions’  negative side eff ect (“harm condition”):
 Th e vice- president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 
“We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profi ts, but 
it will also harm the environment.” 
 Th e chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I  just want to make as much profi t as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.” 
 Th ey started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
 Th e second involved a person’s awareness of her action’s  positive side eff ect (“help 
condition”):
 Th e vice- president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 
“We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profi ts, and 
it will also help the environment.” 
 Th e chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about helping the 
environment. I  just want to make as much profi t as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.” 
 Th ey started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped. 
 Th e crucial results were:  83  percent of respondents said that the chairman 
harmed the environment intentionally while only 23 percent said that the chair-
man helped the environment intentionally. Th is is the so- called Knobe Eff ect. It 
demonstrates, according to Knobe, a normative element in our folk concept of 
intentional action. 
 Th is paper is motivated by two observations. Th e fi rst is that by far most 
philosophers share the majoritarian intuition in both of Knobe’s cases, so that 
Knobe  could have just written a traditional conceptual analysis paper. He could 
have just presented his two scenarios  to the reader and entreat  the reader to pass 
a verdict on them; that verdict would have supported the idea of a normative 
aspect in our concept of intentional action just as much as the non- philosophers’ 
verdict. Indeed, I would surmise that among Knobe’s article’s fi rst seventy- eight 
readers, a greater proportion shared the majoritarian intuitions than among 
Knobe’s seventy- eight park- goers. Th ere are various possible reasons for this 
(more on that later), but one suspects that many park- goers who off ered the 
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minority verdicts did so because they did not fully understand the scenarios (or 
the task of reporting an intuitive verdict on them). 1  Such “performance errors” 
were probably avoided by Knobe’s fi rst seventy- eight philosopher- readers. 
 Th e second observation is that once Gettier had devised his well- known 
thought- experimental scenarios (Gettier  1963 ), he could have presented them 
to his undergraduates or some other non- philosopher subjects. But it is not 
immediately obvious what intellectual benefi t this would have brought to episte-
mology; I daresay the history of epistemology would look virtually no diff erent. 
Th e results Gettier would have obtained would have probably been just noisier 
versions of the results he did in fact obtain among his philosophical readership. 
 Th ese two observations raise the question: how much of the signifi cance of 
Knobe’s (unquestionably important) article is really due to Knobe’s decision to 
incorporate an experimental part in it? Since philosophers tend to share the lay 
intuitions on his cases, it is not immediately clear what extra epistemic weight 
was obtained from consulting the non- philosophers. So the question presents 
itself: what was the point of the experimental part of Knobe’s paper? And we may 
generalize: what is the point of experimental philosophy? 
 Approaches to this question can be placed on a spectrum from more infl a-
tionary to more defl ationary answers. On the defl ationary end are positions 
that take experimental philosophy (henceforth, x- phi) to  have no point. On the 
infl ationary extreme are positions that tout x- phi as the only future of philoso-
phy and the end of traditional armchair philosophy. Here I will propose a more 
moderate answer, though one that leans in the defl ationary direction. It may be 
summarized, very roughly, as follows:
 Rationale: Th ere  is a rationale for experimental philosophy, but it is one 
that (i) gives it limited importance and (ii) nestles it in a very traditional 
conception of the philosophical project. 
 I start, in the next subsection, by considering a number of “natural” answers to 
the question of the rationale for x- phi. I argue that by and large they do not with-
stand scrutiny. To restrict the domain of possibilities to something manageable, 
I focus on views that take x- phi to be specially pertinent to our understanding of 
concepts, indeed as claiming to replace armchair conceptual analysis by a more 
modern, more empirically sophisticated investigation of how folk concepts 
behave. Not everybody agrees that this is essential to what x- phi is about (Knobe 
 forthcoming ), much less that it  exhausts what x- phi has to contribute (Rose & 
Danks  2013 ). But since I cannot hope for a completely exhaustive consideration 
of potential approaches to the “point” of x- phi, and since my own view of the 
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relevance of x- phi to metaphysics goes through concepts, I focus here on views 
that tie x- phi to conceptual analysis. 
 1.2  Failed rationales 
 One rationale oft en off ered for the “experimentalization” of conceptual analysis 
is that concepts are psychologically real entities, and so whatever else we do, we 
must study them “empirically” (Knobe, personal communication). Th e imme-
diate question is what it means to say that an inquiry is “empirical.” Th e topic 
is vast, of course, but two central symptoms of empirical research are observa-
tion and testing. At a minimum, then, given that concepts are psychologically 
real entities, we should (i)   observe their causal eff ects (in practice, intuitions 
and intuition- reports regarding their extensions) and (ii)  test hypotheses about 
their intensions in a way that produces confi rmation or disconfi rmation (and 
ultimately verifi cation or falsifi cation). 2  Th is, it might be suggested, is what the 
“experimentalization” of conceptual analysis brings to the table. 
 I want to argue that Gettier’s traditionalist paper did not vary signifi cantly 
from Knobe’s x- phi paper along these dimensions. I speculate that Knobe  formed 
his hypothesis about the concept  intentional action simply by noticing his 
own intuitions about cases such as the one he ultimately presented to his subjects. 
We may think of this “noticing” as a kind of observation— perhaps introspective 
observation in a suitably loose sense. In any case, Gettier must have proceeded 
to his own hypothesis formation through a similar procedure of “observing” his 
intuitions about cases such as the ones he ultimately presented to the reader. So 
there is no real diff erence between Knobe and Gettier as far as the role of obser-
vation is concerned. One might think that the real diff erence pertains to testing: 
Knobe ran his thought- experimental scenarios by seventy- eight subjects before 
reporting on them to the community of inquiry, whereas Gettier skipped that step. 
However, the real intellectual test of both papers, accounting for the impact they 
have had on epistemology and philosophy of action, was in  the encounter with the 
readership . It is because the readers shared immediately Gettier’s intuitions that 
his paper was so infl uential. Had it been met with mixed or uncertain intuitions, 
it would be less infl uential. To that extent, Gettier’s hypothesis withstood a cru-
cial  test of convergence with others’ intuitions. 3  More interestingly, I would sur-
mise that Knobe’s paper’s real infl uence is  also due to his readers’ reactions rather 
than his subjects’. Suppose the intuitions reported by Knobe’s park- side subjects 
were the opposite of what they actually were, with 80- odd percent saying that the 
chairman intentionally  helped the environment in the help condition and only 
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20- odd percent saying that he intentionally  harmed the environment in the harm 
condition. I speculate that most readers of the ensuing article would be inclined 
to suspect that something went wrong in the experimental design, the subjects’ 
understanding of the task, the statistical analysis, or some other nonsubstantive 
aspect of the study. Th ey would  not conclude— not purely on the basis of the 
reported results, at any rate— that the folk concept of intentional action is wildly 
diff erent from what they thought it was. Th us the deeper reason for the Knobe 
Eff ect’s survival and fl ourishing on the marketplace of ideas is not that Knobe 
consulted seventy- eight faculties of intuition rather than one, but that the intui-
tions he consulted converged with his readership’s. To that extent, the hypotheses 
of both papers are equally “empirically tested.” 4  
 A second potential rationale for experimentalization might be that it purges 
inquiry from reliance on such dubious epistemic sources as intuition and intro-
spection and replaces them with a much more respectable methodology. 
 However, x- phi as such appears to rely on intuition and (broadly intro-
spective) noticing- of- intuition just as much as traditional conceptual analysis. 
Knobe’s study does not ostensibly rely on  his own intuition and introspection, 
but it does rely on his random subjects producing intuitions in response to his 
scenario and noticing the intuitions they produced. Moreover, to repeat, the 
study’s intellectual impact is due primarily to his  readership’s intuition and intro-
spection. And in any case, it is doubtful that Knobe’s own intuition played no 
role in the inquiry. At the very least, it played a role in the  context of discovery , 
even if not in the  context of justifi cation (to use Reichenbarch’s old distinction). 
Th e reason Knobe ran the experiment he did, with the scenarios he did, rather 
than another experiment with another pair of scenarios, is presumably that 
he realized, using his own intuition, the interesting eff ect he later appealed to 
seventy- eight random faculties of intuition to reproduce. Th ose subjects’ intui-
tions are relevant to the context of justifi cation, but his own intuition was rel-
evant to the context of discovery. 
 A third potential rationale for experimentalization might be the risk of diver-
gence between philosophers and non- philosophers. Although in Knobe’s original 
study the two groups’ intuitions converged, in other cases they may not. Indeed, 
Starmans and Friedman ( 2012 ) have argued that the folk attribute knowledge in 
Gettier cases! Where such divergence occurs, we should want to  know about it , 
and arguably, it is x- phi’s task to expose where this happens. Moreover, it would 
be reasonable to suggest that wherever such divergence occurs, x- phi discovers 
what the folk concept  really is, as opposed to what the philosophers’ concept is, 
or what the philosophers have made the folk concept out to be. 
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 Th is rationale is more plausible than those considered thus far. But if this 
were the only rationale for experimentalization, the overall impact of the lat-
ter would be limited— perhaps minuscule. For one thing, divergence between 
intuitions reported in surveys and philosophers’ intuitions is quite limited 
(Dunaway, Edmonds, & Manley,  2013 ); Starmans and Friedman’s claims about 
folk reactions to Gettier cases, for example, have come under forceful critique 
(Nagel, San Juan, & Mar,  2013 ). More deeply, where such divergence in intui-
tion- reports does occur, there is an open question as to what lesson we should 
extract from it. As noted, folk intuitions about Knobe’s two cases are just noisier 
versions of philosophers’ intuitions, and one natural explanation of this is that 
non- philosophers’ results involve more performance errors. As Jackson ( 2008 ) 
puts it, Gettier cases are just hard to process immediately, and the most philo-
sophically interesting reactions to them are the  considered responses. On this 
line of thought, divergence between non- philosophers and philosophers may 
simply refl ect the performance/ competence distinction. 5  Where this is the right 
explanation of the diagnosis, the x- phi results are actually  less instructive than 
the philosophers’ armchair intuitions. Now, there are certainly other possible 
explanations for divergences of this sort, ones that give a more central role to 
the x- phi results. Th us, one alternative explanation of a given divergence might 
be that philosophers’ intuitions lie downstream of their substantive philosophi-
cal commitments— whereas the layperson’s intuitions are presumably “purer,” 
lying upstream of theory. 6  In all likelihood, sometimes the philosopher- favor-
ing explanation of the divergence will be the right one and sometimes the phi-
losopher- disfavoring explanation will be. But given that divergence is anyway a 
relatively rare aff air, if x- phi’s signifi cance was exhausted by the cases in which 
divergence occurs and is best explained in a philosopher- disfavoring way, it 
would be very limited indeed. 7  
 * * * 
 A fourth potential rationale for experimentalization is the following. It might be 
suggested that even if armchair results refl ect more than just the philosopher’s 
concept of intentional action, or knowledge, it may still refl ect only a compara-
tively small group’s concept— a group of very specifi c socioeconomic or ethnic or 
cultural profi le, say. Consider Machery et al.’s ( 2004 ) claim that Kripkean intui-
tions undergirding causal theories of reference are not shared by East Asians, or 
for that matter Machery et al.’s (forthcoming) claims that Gettier intuitions are 
 stable across cultures. Th e fact that we cannot know in advance of experimental 
research whether such robust intuitions as were elicited by Kripke and Gettier 
will extend to other cultures demonstrates the value of x- phi. 
9781474278621_pi-236.indd   12 2/17/2017   11:44:44 AM
 Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis 13
13
 My response is twofold. First, even if we accept such claims at face value— 
and many do not (Systma & Livengood  2011 )— this would at most justify the 
cross- cultural (or more generally the variability) component of x- phi research; 
it leaves untouched more “modest” conceptual-analysis claims, such as that 
 Western civilization’s concept of reference involves a causal dimension and that 
 Western civilization’s concept of knowledge requires more than Justifi ed True 
Belief. Experimentalization has not yet been shown to be needed for the assess-
ment of such claims. More crucially, cross- cultural research of this kind involves 
a principled diffi  culty concerning the perfect match between translations. Th e 
diffi  culty may be summarized as follows: if concepts individuate sensitively to 
their conceptual role, then in all likelihood non- English words used to trans-
late “refers” into such languages as Cantonese, where Kripke intuitions are 
claimed not to be sustained, do not express the same concept that “refers” does. 
Accordingly, the relevant cross- cultural studies do not reveal a diff erence in  the 
concept of reference ; they only reveal that other cultures fi nd it more useful to 
work with a closely associated concept than with the concept of reference. Let 
me expand on this a little. 
 Anyone who has engaged in translation work knows that the operative task 
is to fi nd the  closest word in the translation language to the word in the original 
language; there is typically no expectation, nor hope, of fi nding a word whose 
entire web of connotations— its full conceptual role, as philosophers would put 
it— is strictly  identical to that of the original word. 8  For anyone who thinks that 
concepts individuate sensitively to their conceptual role, this means that the 
translating word and the translated word do not express a perfectly  identical 
concept but only the two closest concepts the translator could pinpoint. Th us, 
while it is unquestionable that the  best French translation of “S knows that  p ” is 
“S sais que  p ,” it is highly unlikely that the concepts expressed by “knows” and 
“sais” are identical; for example, the fact that the verb “connaitre” in French is 
also best translated as “to know” means that some of the conceptual work per-
formed by “knows” is  not likewise shouldered by “sais.” Th e conceptual roles are 
thus diff erent, which plausibly entails that the concepts themselves are diff erent. 
So any study that claimed to look into French speakers’ concept of knowledge 
would be missing out on the fact that “the concept of knowledge,” that is, the 
concept expressed by the English word “knowledge,” is probably  not the concept 
expressed by the French “savoir.” And if this sort of conceptual daylight opens 
when we move from English to French, presumably the conceptual distance 
when moving from English to Cantonese is even starker. If so, the aforemen-
tioned studies do not quite reveal the intuitions that subjects in other cultures 
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have regarding the concepts of  reference and  knowledge , that is, the concepts 
expressed by the English words “reference” and “knowledge”; what they suggest, 
rather, is that subjects in the relevant cultures work in semantic and epistemic 
contexts with slightly diff erent concepts than we do. 
 It is  epistemically possible , of course, that (i)  the concept expressed by the 
best translation of “knows” in  some language is strictly identical to the concept 
expressed by “knows” (that is, the concept of knowledge) and (ii) competent 
speakers of that language will consistently return diff erent verdicts on Gettier 
cases. Th is is possible, but for any given language the probability that this is 
what is going on is overwhelmingly smaller than that the two concepts are ever 
so slightly diff erent. Certainly this is what the canon of translation instructs us 
to surmise, as Davidson ( 1974 ) has already shown. Suppose I hold up a coff ee 
mug and exclaim “Look at my new tiger— it’s a very nice tiger, and more than all 
other tigers I’ve had before it keeps the coff ee inside warm while ensuring my 
fi ngers don’t get burned.” In trying to understand me, you face two interpretive 
options: (a) I believe that I have a new tiger, and take the word “tiger” to express 
the concept of a tiger; (b) I believe that I have a new coff ee mug, and take “tiger” 
to express the concept of a coff ee mug. What is striking here is that any remotely 
competent interpreter would go for interpretation (b). By the same token, when 
less dramatic divergence from our web of beliefs occurs, it is incumbent on us to 
start with the presumption that the words used by the other side are not perfect 
translations of the words we use. Th is is the very meaning of the principle of 
charity, as a constraint on the competence of an interpreter. In assuming that 
the words that best translate “refers” in various languages in which Kripke intui-
tions do not hold up express the exact same concept “refers” expresses, Machery 
et al. ( 2004 ) eff ectively violate the principle of charity, thus failing to interpret 
competently their subjects. 9  
 A further potential rationale for experimentalization might be that experi-
mental studies have shown that intuitions about thought- experimental scenarios 
can vary with truth- independent factors (Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg,  2008 ), 
such as the font in which vignettes are displayed. Th is is claimed to debunk the 
very idea of using thought experiments in clarifying the structure of concepts. 
Th e problem with this proposed rationale is that it would not support Knobe’s 
decision to add an experimental component to his article— it would support 
Knobe not writing his article at all. For what it suggests is that intuitions about 
presented vignettes are epistemically worthless. So, the proposed rationale is not 
really a rationale for experimentalizing the study of concepts via consultation 
of folk subjects’ intuitive reactions to thought- experimental scenarios, but for 
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abandoning this kind of inquiry altogether. It would dismiss any research using 
vignettes and surveys in the style of social psychology to understand the struc-
ture of folk concepts. Yet the vast majority of x- phi research does just that. Th is 
is explicitly acknowledged by proponents of this rationale (Alexander, Mallon, & 
Weinberg,  2010 ), who have argued that the “negative program” of x- phi (expos-
ing the truth- insensitive aspects of intuition reports) undermines the “positive 
program” of x- phi (empirically discovering the structure of folk concepts). 10  
While this may be, the eff ect of the negative program would be to destroy a 
certain type of inquiry, not to “experimentalize” it. In this paper, however, my 
concern is to identify a rationale for experimentalization— a rationale, therefore, 
for x- phi’s positive program. 
 Knobe’s own current view is that x- phi is straight- up cognitive science that 
happens to be carried out by people whose salary is paid by philosophy depart-
ments (Knobe,  forthcoming ). Perhaps; but the signifi cance of this notion should 
be fully appreciated by proponents of x- phi. On this view, experimental phi-
losophy is as much a kind of philosophy as a rubber duck is a kind of duck. It 
is a historical accident that Stephen Stich was already a respected professional 
philosopher and stayed in Rutgers’s philosophy department, when his interests 
started to migrate into areas that, at the level of substance, are nonphilosophical, 
and that he attracted many talented students within Rutgers’s philosophy PhD 
program who went on to obtain positions in various philosophy departments 
around the United States and to propagate a type of nonphilosophical inquiry 
within the institutional structure of philosophy. On this picture, then, experi-
mental philosophy has nothing directly to do with philosophy. 11  , 12  I fi nd this line 
excessively dispiriting; my hunch is that there actually is something about phi-
losophy’s project that potentially calls, at some point in its pursuit, for the kind 
of research performed by x- phi. In the remainder of this paper, I explore a kind 
of contribution that x- phi could make (and make  in virtue of its experimental 
dimension) to philosophy proper. 
 Doing so is complicated by the fact that it is far from clear what makes a given 
piece of inquiry “philosophy proper.” Obviously, we cannot take this matter up 
here. 13  Instead, I will dogmatically adopt, without argument, one specifi c, quite 
traditional conception of the philosophical project. With this view of the  ends 
of philosophical inquiry in place, I will develop— rather speculatively— a line of 
thought that secures a place for x- phi as a  means for the pursuit of those ends. 
Since I will not argue for the relevant conception of philosophy, my main claim 
is better thought of as conditional:  if we adopt that conception,  then we can make 
sense of the role of experimental methods in philosophy proper. Warning: even 
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my case for this conditional will be highly speculative, involving many substan-
tive assumptions about the structure of concepts that cannot be defended here. 
 2.  Conceptual analysis and serious metaphysics 
 Th ere is a traditional way of doing philosophy that features centrally a cluster of 
familiar practices, including careful examination of arguments and objections; 
clarifi cation and analysis of central concepts; rife appeal to thought experiments 
and the intuitions they elicit; marked sensitivity to parsimony considerations; a 
premium on armchair reasoning, and more. But what is the overarching project 
in the service of which these practices are deployed? Th is is not an easy ques-
tion, and as promised, here I dogmatically adopt one particular answer to it. It is 
the answer articulated by Frank Jackson in  From Metaphysics to Ethics (Jackson, 
 1998a ) and further developed by David Chalmers in  Constructing the World 
(Chalmers,  2012 ). Jackson calls the project he articulates “serious metaphysics”; 
he presents the main idea as follows:
 Metaphysics is about what there is and what it is like. But it is not concerned 
with any old shopping list of what there is and what it is like. Metaphysicians 
seek a comprehensive account of some subject- matter— the mind, the semantic, 
or, most ambitiously, everything— in terms of a limited number of more or less 
basic notions. (Jackson,  1998a : 5) 
 Serious metaphysics has two central features: “it is discriminatory, and it claims 
completeness” (1998a: 27). At the end of serious- metaphysical inquiry, if you 
will, we would have a  complete theory of the world, a theory that leaves noth-
ing unaccounted for. But despite leaving nothing unaccounted for, the theory 
would list only a  proper subset of all truths. For example, while it might list 
“Jimmy is a boson,” and perhaps also “No boson is a fermion,” it will  not list 
“Jimmy is not a fermion.” Likewise, while it might list “Johnny is an electron” 
and “Electrons are particles with negative charge,” it will not also list “Jimmy is 
a particle with negative charge.” Th e reason is that it does not  need to list these 
extra truths to ensure that nothing is left  unaccounted for— that the  whole truth 
is captured by it. 
 Let us call “fundamental” the statements our complete theory explicitly 
lists and “derivative” those it does not— but which are nonetheless true by its 
lights. And likewise let us call the notions appearing in the fundamental state-
ments “fundamental notions” and those appearing only in derivative statements 
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“derivative notions.” 14  Th en the above characteristics of serious metaphysics may 
be stated as follows:
 Complete: Serious metaphysics attempts to produce a  total theory of the 
world, that is, a theory of everything. 
 Discriminate: Serious metaphysics discriminates between fundamental 
and derivative statements (and notions). 
 Jackson argues for a third crucial characteristic of serious metaphysics as he 
views it, what he calls “entry by entailment.” Th e idea is that any statement S not 
listed by a serious- metaphysical theory T qualifi es as true by T’s lights  only if S is 
 entailed by T’s fundamental statements. In other words:
 Entail: Th e relationship between fundamental and derivative statements 
in the total theory of the world is that of entailment. 
 Serious metaphysics is fully characterized by the conjunction of  Complete , 
 Discriminate, and  Entail . 15  
 For Jackson ( 1998a :  ch.2), conceptual analysis has a crucial role to play in 
serious metaphysics. Given a complete description of the world in fundamental 
notions, we may wish to know whether some statement involving other notions 
is true; but to consider this question, we need an account of the relevant other 
notion in terms of the fundamental ones. Within the framework of serious 
metaphysics, we might put this as follows. Given fundamental truths A 1 ,…, A n  
and a statement S, if S involves only notions already appearing in A 1 ,…, A n , 
we can always use purely formal means to determine whether S is entailed by 
A 1 ,…, A n . But if S involves some notions foreign to A 1 ,…, A n , then in most 
cases there will be no purely formal tests for entailment. 16  We must appeal to 
a priori bridge principles that connect fundamental and derivative notions. As 
Chalmers ( 2012 ) shows, such bridge principles need not amount to defi nitions 
of the derivative notions in terms of the fundamental ones; all they require are 
analytic one- way conditionals. With such conditionals in place, we can consider 
whether S is entailed by (or at least consistent with) the conjunction of A 1 ,…, A n  
plus the relevant analytic conditionals. 
 For example, suppose it is known that in 1900, 50 percent of thirty- year- old 
Spaniards were male, and that 20  percent of thirty- year- old male Spaniards 
were unmarried. Th en the statement “In 1900, 10  percent of thirty- year- old 
Spaniards were bachelors” should be regarded as true. But this statement does 
not  formally follow from the other two, since the notion of a bachelor does not 
appear in those two. To derive it, we must have in place the  conceptual claim that 
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unmarried adult males are bachelors. It is the mandate of conceptual analysis 
to supply this extra claim. Without conceptual analysis, we cannot evaluate the 
truth of any non- fundamental statement that features any term not used in the 
fundamental statements. 
 Th e starkest illustration of this is with non- fundamental  existentials . 
Presumably, the fundamental truths about the world will not mention police-
men and ghosts. Yet, “Th ere are policemen” is among the truths they will entail, 
whereas “Th ere are ghosts” is not. How can we account for this pattern of 
entailment? Th e answer is that the fundamental truths guarantee the existence 
of policemen but not that of ghosts  given what it takes for some chunk of the 
world to qualify as a policeman or a ghost. It is the job of conceptual analysis, 
now, to tell us what it takes for some chunk of the world to qualify as an N, for 
any derivative N (i.e., for any notion that does not appear in any fundamental 
truth). Th us insofar as metaphysics is supposed to tell us, for any putative entity 
mentioned only in non- fundamental truths, whether it exists or not, there is 
no way to decide the question without engaging in conceptual analysis. Some 
putative entities mentioned in non- fundamental truths should be grounded 
in or reduced to (combinations of) entities mentioned in fundamental truths; 
some should be eliminated from our picture of the world. Th e choice between 
reductivism and eliminativism about such non- fundamentals requires doing 
some conceptual analysis of the notions used to denote them. 17  
 Philosophers are sometimes challenged by scientists to explain why they 
routinely conjure up outlandish thought experiments that have nothing to do 
with what we know empirically of the way the world is— and what they hope 
to learn from it. Conceptual analysis makes sense of the philosopher’s appeal 
to thought experiments (though there may be other ways to make sense of it). 
Th e “method of cases,” as it is sometimes called, can invoke thought experi-
ments to fl esh out conceivable (read:  conceptually possible) scenarios and 
then consider whether these scenarios intuitively qualify as cases of C, in 
the sense that the concept of C intuitively applies to them. Traditional con-
ceptual analysts devised thought experiments in their armchair, consulted 
their own intuitions about those, and shared the results with the commu-
nity of inquiry through publication. Experimental conceptual analysts 
devise thought experiments in lab meetings (where the details of presenta-
tion of those thought experiments in digestible vignettes are fi xed), consult 
the intuitive reports of undergraduate students about them, and share their 
results as traditionalists have. 
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 From this perspective, one philosophical role of x- phi might be in the con-
text of serious metaphysics, in particular the part of serious metaphysics that 
involves bridging fundamental and derivative truths. Within this framework, a 
strong rationale for x- phi would show why the experimentalization of concep-
tual analysis is (at least sometimes) inevitable, or recommended, for pursuit 
of serious- metaphysical questions— in particular, the question of “reduction 
or elimination?” for various putative entities cited in non- fundamental truths. 
 In the next section, I take a fi rst step toward showing that conceptual analysis 
may indeed sometimes call for experimentalization. As promised, my gambit is 
highly speculative. And in any case, it would provide only  one possible ration-
ale for x- phi— which may not be the  only one. It is also a rationale that would 
work only for someone with sympathies for Jackson’s project of serious meta-
physics, which is not for everybody. My own belief is that the aforementioned 
cluster of philosophical practices cannot be made sense of unless one conceives 
of philosophy as centrally involving something like what Jackson calls serious 
metaphysics; conceptions of philosophy that do away with such a project will 
fi nd that they cannot make sense of why philosophers’ workaday looks the way 
it does. Obviously, I cannot argue for this here. Instead, I adopt Jackson’s frame-
work dogmatically, and try to show that it makes room for (occasional) experi-
mentalization of the kind of inquiry revolving around thought experiments and 
intuitions. 
 3.  Twenty- fi rst- century conceptual analysis 
 Th e original technique of conceptual analysis consisted in producing severally 
necessary and conjointly suffi  cient conditions for an item falling under a con-
cept. A paradigm of this is the analysis of knowledge as (i) justifi ed (ii) true (iii) 
belief. For a variety of reasons, latter- day conceptual analysis oft en relies on a 
more powerful technique:  Ramsifi cation. Th is technique is more powerful in 
that it subsumes necessary- and- suffi  cient- conditions as a special case, as we will 
see below. 
 3.1  Straightforward Ramsey sentences 
 A simple Ramsey sentence for a concept C is produced by collecting platitudes 
about items that fall under C, making a long conjunction out of these platitudes, 
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replacing occurrences of “C” and cognates with a variable, and prefacing the 
conjunction with an existential quantifi er. Consider for example our concept of 
the sun. Here are a dozen platitudes of relevance: 
   Th e sun is extremely hot 
   Th e sun looks yellow 
   Th e sun rises in the east 
   Th e sun sets in the west 
   Th e sun shines longer in summer than in winter 
   Basking in the sun makes people happy 
   Th e sun is more or less spherical 
   Th e sun is very far from Earth 
   Th e Earth rotates around the sun 
   Most or all life on Earth is impossible without the sun 
   Th e sun is much bigger than the earth 
   Too much exposure to the sun can cause cancer 
 Th ese statements about the sun are “platitudes” in the sense that they are widely 
shared among non- experts. (Note that this does not require they be based on 
perception or “common sense,” though oft en they are.) We construct a simple 
Ramsey sentence out of this dozen as follows:
 ( Sun 1  ) Th ere is a (single)  x , such that  x is extremely hot,  x looks yellow, 
 x rises in the east,  x sets in the west,  x shines longer in summer than in 
winter, basking in  x makes people happy,  x is more or less spherical,  x is 
very far from Earth, the Earth rotates around  x , most or all life on Earth 
is impossible without  x ,  x is much bigger than the earth, and too much 
exposure to  x can cause cancer. 
 Th e full Ramsey sentence for the concept  Sun would involve many more plati-
tudes than this, but the point is clear:   Sun is the concept that picks out that 
worldly item that satisfi es this kind of Ramsey sentence. It is this concept that is 
expressed by the public- language name “the sun.” 18  
 Conceptual analysis by Ramsifi cation made an early appearance in the phi-
losophy of mind, where Lewis ( 1966 ) used it to propose a functionalist analysis 
of  pain in terms of pain platitudes. Th is sort of “analytic functionalism” was 
later contrasted with “psycho- functionalism” (Block 1980), which involved 
Ramsifying over scientifi c statements enjoying wide consensus among experts 
but not typically shared by the wider populace. Consider the following dozen 
statements about the sun: 
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   Th e sun’s energy is produced by fusion reactions at the sun’s core 
   Th e temperature at the sun’s core is at least 10,000,000°C 
   Th e sun’s core is mostly made of liquid hydrogen 
   Th e sun’s hydrogen has been fueling it for about 5 billion years 
   Energy from the sun’s core is transferred to the sun’s surface, the 
photosphere, through radiation and convection 
   Th e sun’s photosphere is the part of the sun visible from Earth 
   Th e sun’s photosphere is about 5,000 km deep 
   Th e sun’s diameter is ~1,400,000 km 
   Th e temperature on the sun’s photosphere is ~5,500°C 
   Th e sun’s photosphere is mostly gaseous 
   Th e temperature on the chromosphere, the sun’s lower atmosphere, is 
~60,000°C 
   Temperatures on the corona, the sun’s upper atmosphere, are oft en 
~1,000,000°C 
 Collecting these and others like them, one may produce the following “scien-
tifi c” Ramsey sentence:
 ( Sun 2  ) Th ere is a (single)  x , such that  x ’s energy is produced by fusion 
reactions at  x ’s core, the temperature at  x ’s core is at least 10,000,000°C, . . . 
 Late in his career, Lewis (1994) maintained that a proper Ramsey sentence 
should appeal to both platitudes and scientifi c consensus. A proper Ramsey sen-
tence for  Sun , for example, would use both dozens above. 
 Th is sort of two- band Ramsey sentence is very natural in analyzing concepts. 
In a way, the  Merriam- Webster defi nition of the sun does just that:
 Th e luminous celestial body around which the earth and other planets revolve, 
from which they receive heat and light, which is composed mainly of hydro-
gen and helium, and which has a mean distance from earth of about 93,000,000 
miles (150,000,000 kilometers), a linear diameter of 864,000 miles (1,390,000 
kilometers), and a mass 332,000 times greater than earth. 
 Here we are off ered seven central statements about the sun, three broadly plati-
tudinous and four broadly scientifi c. 19  
 Although a two- band Ramsey sentence of this sort can become quite compli-
cated, the basic structure of a Ramsey sentence can also remain rather simple. 
Th us, if we think that  bachelor simply picks out the property of being both 
(i) unmarried and (ii) a man, we can formulate an exceptionally short Ramsey 
sentence with just two platitudes: something like “Th ere is an (attribute of being 
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an)  x , such that every  x is unmarried and every  x is a man.” Th is would be a 
Ramsifi ed version of the older necessary- and- suffi  cient- conditions analysis of 
 bachelor . It is in this sense that Ramsifi cation is more  powerful a conceptual- 
analysis technique than defi nition by necessary and suffi  cient conditions: con-
cepts that admit of traditional analysis by necessary and suffi  cient conditions 
always admit also of analysis by Ramsifi cation, but some concepts that do not 
admit of traditional necessary- and- suffi  cient- conditions analysis may yet suc-
cumb to analysis by Ramsifi cation. Th e hope is that the Ramsey technique is 
powerful enough to accurately capture the structure of  all our folk concepts. 
 Th e philosophical program of conceptual analysis by Ramsifi cation is oft en 
referred to as the Canberra Plan (Price & O’Leary- Hawthorne,  1996 ), due to 
its dominance at the Australian National University in Canberra. Th e approach 
raises a number of immediate diffi  culties, however. What happens if more than 
one entity satisfi es a simple Ramsey sentence (think of jadeite and nephrite, both 
of which satisfy the platitudes about jade)? What if no entity satisfi es absolutely 
all of them, but one does satisfy most (think of  dolphin before Linnaeus, whose 
Ramsey sentence presumably included the platitude “Th e dolphin is a fi sh”)? 
How can diff erent individuals share concepts if they associate diff erent plati-
tudes with them? How can concepts co- refer before and aft er the establishment 
of scientifi c consensus regarding central statements? Th ese and other questions 
make clear that a more sophisticated brand of Ramsey sentence is needed. 
 3.2  Studies in advanced Ramsifi cation 
 I start by mentioning four principled challenges to conceptual analysis by 
Ramsifi cation. I  call them the Quinean Challenge, the Kripkean Challenge, 
the Putnamian Challenge, and the Burgean Challenge. I then suggest technical 
modifi cations of Ramsey sentences intended to address them. 
 Th e Quinean Challenge concerns the rejection of the analytic/ synthetic dis-
tinction (Quine,  1951 ). For Quine, when some item  a falls under a concept C, 
there is no dichotomy between truths about  a that are constitutive of its falling 
under C and truths that just happen to hold as well. Statements about things that 
qualify as C do not divide neatly into those that are nonnegotiable for something’s 
status as a C and those that are negotiable. On the contrary, every conviction 
about the Cs is in principle revisable. Th us, for each platitude P about the sun, 
something can qualify as the sun even if it fails to exhibit the property P attrib-
utes to the sun. If this is right, then sentences  Sun 1  and  Sun 2  cannot be used to 
model our concept of the sun. For the falsehood of any platitude showing up in 
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 Sun 1  or Sun 2  would render the sentence false, that is, would mean that there 
is no thing that satisfi es  Sun 1  or  Sun 2  . Intuitively, however, the sun exists! 
Furthermore, in sentences such as  Sun 1  or  Sun 2  all platitudes have equal weight 
within the Ramsey sentence they make up— which confl icts with the more fl ex-
ible Quinean picture of variable revisability. 20  
 Th e Kripkean Challenge concerns rigid designation and direct reference 
(Kripke,  1972 ). When you and I look at the sun and converse on the weather, 
the reason we manage to communicate appears to have nothing to do with the 
platitudes we each happen to associate with the sun. It is perfectly conceivable 
that we should share  no sun platitudes and still manage to communicate. Th us 
some concepts do not pick out their referent via a description of its properties. 
Instead, they pick it out  directly . Th ere may be properties of the object in virtue 
of which it is picked out by the concept, but these need not be properties the 
concept possessor herself associates with it. Accordingly, such concepts pick out 
the same thing(s) in (or rather  at ) every possible world, regardless of changes in 
the referent’s properties across worlds. Th at is, these concepts are “rigid designa-
tors.” Th us, what makes it the case that the sun is the referent of our concept  Sun 
is simply the fact that the sun is the main cause of tokenings of  Sun . It is because 
the same object causes tokenings of my sun concept and your sun concept that 
we manage to communicate, even if we share no beliefs about the sun’s proper-
ties. Furthermore, our sun concepts pick out the sun at all other possible worlds 
in which it exists, even in worlds where the sun is so diff erent from the way it is 
in the actual world that most platitudes concerning it no longer hold. 
 Similar themes animate the Putnamian Challenge, which has to do with 
an alleged  hidden indexical in many concepts (Putnam,  1975 ). According to 
Putnam, concepts such as  water involve a hidden indexical component: they 
pick out the watery stuff   around here , that is, the watery stuff   of our acquaint-
ance . Th is too is crucial to communication. As noted, you and I can success-
fully communicate about the sun even if the platitudes we associate with it have 
nothing in common. Even if you were a scientist whose tacit beliefs about the 
sun conformed to  Sun 2  and I a layperson in the grip of  Sun 1  , we would not be 
speaking past each other. Indeed, we can associate inconsistent platitudes with 
the sun and yet manage to communicate. Th is is because we would both be sim-
ply referring to the celestial object before our eyes— for Putnam, the object our 
perceptual experiences refer to indexically. 
 Th e Burgean Challenge concerns the division of linguistic labor (Burge 
[ 1979 ], though see already Putnam [ 1975 ]). Observe that many in our linguistic 
(and conceptual!) community are unaware of the statements collected in  Sun 2  . 
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Yet arguably some of them are essential to our shared concept of the sun, as 
indeed suggested by the  Merriam- Webster entry. It is a structural feature of many 
of our concepts, claims Burge, that they involve deference to experts. In using 
“Sun,” I implicitly consent to refer not to whatever satisfi es  my core beliefs about 
the sun but to what also satisfi es certain core beliefs of helio- buff s. Th e same 
point can be made about  concepts . Th e reference of my  own C is governed not 
(only) by the platitudes  I associate with Cs, but by the deeper truths that the afi -
cionados associate with Cs. Interestingly, according to Burge there are also many 
concepts that involve deference not to experts but to the community at large— as 
when it is built into my concept  sofa that a sofa is in part the kind of thing that 
others in my community call a sofa (Burge,  1986 ). 
 Not everybody accepts the philosophical claims these challenges are based 
upon (regarding the analytic/ synthetic distinction, direct reference, hidden 
indexicals, and the division of linguistic labor). But it is hard to deny that  some 
insight underlies each. Th e question is whether a suffi  ciently sophisticated 
Ramsey sentence can accommodate these insights. I think it can. 
 * * * 
 Start with the Quinean Challenge. It seems intuitively clear that many concepts 
can successfully refer even if some statements in their associated Ramsey sen-
tences are false. For example, it may turn out that the big celestial body you 
and I are looking at is  not extremely hot. Instead, there is a tiny speck, always 
just next to the sun, that generates all the heat we ordinarily associate with the 
sun. Intuitively, this illusion would not undermine our concept’s reference to 
the big celestial body we are looking at. It would not, for example, make it the 
case that our sun concept really picks out the speck, or has “indeterminate ref-
erence” (whatever that means). In other words, the “extremely hot” platitude is 
negotiable. Likewise for the “rotates” platitude: heliocentrism may turn out to 
be wrong, and  Sun would still refer to the sun. Th e problem is that the above 
Ramsey sentences make these platitudes nonnegotiable: their falsity ensures ref-
erence failure. 
 Fortunately, Lewis ( 1972 : 256) raises and solves this problem in half a sen-
tence. His suggestion is that instead of forming a long conjunction of  all plati-
tudes about the sun, we form an even longer disjunction of all conjunctions of 
 most platitudes (see also Jackson,  1998a : 35). Suppose our concept of the sun 
works in such a way that an object need only satisfy any eight of the dozen sun 
platitudes in  Sun 1  in order to qualify as the sun. Th en we could proceed by fi rst 
forming every conjunction of (at least) eight among these platitudes, then form-
ing the disjunction of all those conjunctions, and then replacing occurrences of 
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“the sun” with a bound variable. We would then obtain a Ramsey sentence agile 
enough to capture the way our concept of the sun works (in this scenario). 
 More generally, suppose in analyzing concept C we Ramsify over statements 
that ascribe properties P 1 , …, P 12 , and any  x qualifi es as a C just if it satisfi es eight 
of these statements. Th en our Ramsey sentence for C would take the form:
 ( Lws ) Th ere is a (single)  x , such that  x is P 1  &  x P 2  & . . .  x is P 8 , or P 2  &  x P 3  & 
. . .  x is P 9 , or P 1  &  x P 2  & . . .  x is P 7  & P 9 , or. . . 
 Call this a  Lewis sentence . A Lewis sentence is a  species of a Ramsey sentence, but 
one that can accommodate Quine’s claims, including that negotiability comes in 
degrees. Within a Ramsifi cation framework, this means that some platitudes are 
more central and some are more marginal. For example, “Th e sun is extremely 
hot” seems more central to our concept of the sun than “Th e sun is more or less 
spherical.” Presumably, if a relatively marginal platitude turns out to be false, 
this should not aff ect the concept’s tendency to refer successfully as much as if 
a central platitude does. 21  Th is can be refl ected in the following Lewis- sentence 
feature. In  Lws above, each platitude appears in equally many disjuncts, and 
most disjuncts have the same number of conjuncts in it (eight). 22  But we can 
imagine a Lewis sentence in which some platitudes appear in more disjuncts 
than others. Th is would refl ect a greater relative nonnegotiability, that is, a lesser 
relative revisability. Th us, we can model the fact that “Th e sun is extremely hot” 
is more central to our concept of the sun than “Th e sun is more or less spherical” 
by making the former show up in more disjuncts than the latter in our Lewis 
sentence for  Sun . 
 Note that a statement that appeared in  every disjunct would be  completely 
nonnegotiable (irrevisable), in the sense that its turning out false would guar-
antee that the concept fails to refer. As noted, Quine’s view was that  nothing is 
entirely nonnegotiable in our concept of the sun. What this means is that there is 
no property ascribed by our concept of the sun such that if nothing instantiates 
it, then the concept is empty. Th is could be captured by ensuring that no state-
ment appearing in the Lewis sentence for  Sun showed up in every disjunct of the 
sentence. Of course, Quine may be simply wrong about this, perhaps not when it 
comes to  Sun but with respect to some other concept(s). In fact, I would be sur-
prised if none of our concepts involve a nonnegotiable descriptive component. 
But the Lewis sentence as such can be used to model both types of concept— 
those that involve nonnegotiable statements and those that do not— and the dif-
ference between them can in fact be captured by the formal properties of Lewis 
sentences. 
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 It is possible to hold that while no individual platitude associated with a con-
cept is nonnegotiable by itself, certain combinations of platitudes are  conjointly 
nonnegotiable. For example, suppose we thought that the fi rst four platitudes 
in  Sun 1  are such that if they  all turned out to be false, then the concept would 
be empty aft er all. Th en although no single platitude should appear as a con-
junct in every disjunct of our Lewis sentence for the sun, the  disjunction of these 
four platitudes should appear as a conjunct in every disjunct. Th e point is that 
Ramsey sentences can be agile enough to capture various potentially quite subtle 
aspects of the psychological reality of concepts. 
 (We might also think that some concepts are such that a certain platitude 
associated with them is so  central to them that its truth guarantees that the con-
cept refers. Th is could be captured by a Lewis sentence one of whose disjuncts 
featured a single statement.) 
 In conclusion, we may or may not be impressed by Quine’s attack on the 
analytic/ synthetic distinction, and accordingly may or may not  wish to accom-
modate Quine’s relevant ideas in our Ramsey sentences. What I have tried to 
show here is just that Ramsey sentences  have the resources to accommodate 
the Quinean ideas. In other words, rejection of the analytic/ synthetic dis-
tinction would not by itself undermine the project of conceptual analysis by 
Ramsifi cation. 
 * * * 
 What about the other challenges to conceptual analysis? Kripke, Putnam, and 
Burge have developed accounts that challenge the  analyzability of concepts, by 
arguing that certain concepts’ behavior is not fi xed by their descriptive con-
tent (and/ or that certain concepts do not  have descriptive content). Th ese raise 
momentous issues in the philosophy of language that cannot be settled here. 
What I want to do here is relatively modest: remind that  the phenomena Kripke, 
Putnam, and Burge appeal to in the context of motivating their accounts of 
concepts  can be accommodated within a rich conception of descriptive con-
tent, in a way that lends them to analysis by Ramsey sentence. Th e underly-
ing philosophy- of- language question of whether these phenomena are  best 
accounted for as (a) built into descriptive content, (b) involving non- descriptive 
content, or (c) somehow content- transcendent is something we cannot address 
here with any seriousness. 
 Starting with the Burgean challenge, it may well be that many folk concepts 
have built into them an element of deference to experts, or to others in one’s 
community. But if so, a full Ramsey sentence could simply incorporate  deferen-
tial platitudes such as: 
9781474278621_pi-236.indd   26 2/17/2017   11:44:44 AM
 Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis 27
27
   Th e sun has most of the properties the experts’ consensus says it does 
   Th e sun is the object referred to by other community members’ use of 
“the sun” 
 Accordingly,  Sun 1  for example could be reformulated as follows:
 ( Sun 3  ) Th ere is a (single)  x , such that  x is extremely hot,  x looks yellow,  x 
rises in the east, . . .  x is much bigger than the earth, too much exposure to 
 x can cause cancer  x has most of the properties the experts’ consensus days it 
does , and  x is the object referred to by community- members’ use of “the sun.” 
 Th ese kinds of sentence seem to accommodate the Burgean insight. Presumably, 
if some concepts pick out their referents in virtue of experts’ beliefs, it is because 
that is how these concepts work— they “specify,” so to speak, that this is how we 
are to home in on the right referent or extension. Th us unless I tacitly assented to 
the deferential platitudes when conversing about the weather with astronomers, 
we might very well be talking past each other. 23  
 A similar approach has been applied to the Kripkean Challenge, by various 
defenders of descriptivist theories of meaning. Nothing in Kripke’s arguments 
rules out, they have claimed, a sort of “causal descriptivism” or “rigid descrip-
tivism” that would accommodate his insights within a descriptivist framework 
(see Kroon,  1987 ; Lewis, 1994). For example, we can accommodate Kripke’s 
causal claim by adding to our Ramsey sentence for  Sun causal platitudes, 
such as: 
   Th e sun is the main cause of  Sun tokenings 
 As for the rigidity of some concepts, it can be accommodated simply by rigidi-
fying their corresponding Ramsey sentences (Brody,  1977 ; Jackson,  1998b ). 
Incorporating both rigidifi cation and causal platitudes, we turn  Sun 3  into some-
thing like this:
 ( Sun 4  ) Th ere is a (single)  x , such that,  in the actual world ,  x is extremely 
hot,  x looks yellow,  x rises in the east, . . . too much exposure to  x can cause 
cancer,  x has most of the properties the experts’ consensus days it does, x 
is the object referred to by community- members’ use of “the sun,” and x is 
the main cause of tokenings of   Sun . 
 Admittedly, these moves by descriptivists have met with various further chal-
lenges (see Brock,  2004 for a particularly strong critique). As noted, we will 
not address here the underlying philosophy- of- language question of what the 
best theory of concepts is. Th e point is only that Ramsey sentences  can readily 
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incorporate the kinds of information that direct- reference theorists have thought 
essential to concepts. 
 Similar remarks apply to Putnam’s Challenge. If communication can be estab-
lished with as little as joint perceptual awareness of the same object, as Putnam 
claims, then we should also add perceptual platitudes such as: 
   Th e sun is that of which I seem to be perceptually aware when I have my sun 
experiences 
   Th e sun is that of which others seem to be aware when they have perceptual 
experiences subjectively like my sun experiences 
 Sun 4  can be strengthened with platitudes of this sort to accommodate the insight 
underlying the Putnam Challenge. 
 A word on the commitments incurred by the moves just sketched would not 
be out of place. On the one hand, I do not wish to commit to the truth of Kripke’s, 
Putnam’s, and Burge’s underlying claims about concepts’ content. Perhaps (some or 
all) concepts involve no deference, no hidden indexical, no causal, and/ or no rigidi-
fi ed content. I remain offi  cially silent on this issue. My point is only that Ramsey 
sentences can accommodate the kinds of phenomenon Kripke, Putnam, and Burge 
appeal to in making the case for those claims. 24  Conversely, however, I do not wish 
to commit to a descriptivist theory of concepts’ reference, which insists that our 
concepts’ behavior is fi xed  entirely by their descriptive content. Rather, assuming 
that a concept’s descriptive content is  what can be analyzed in that concept, I want to 
highlight just how far the analysis of a concept can go. (More on this in  section 4.2 .) 
 It might be objected that it is psychologically unrealistic to expect the folk 
concept of the sun to incorporate such subtle deferential, causal, and percep-
tual platitudes. For example, small children with whom we routinely discuss 
the sun are unlikely to associate Kripke’s causal platitude with their concept of 
the sun. In response, I would personally want to agree that the perceptual and 
community- deferential platitudes are much more central to our concept of the 
sun than any causal and expert- deferential ones. I  take it that this is what is 
shown by the fact that we can communicate about the sun with children who 
are unlikely to incorporate the latter platitudes into their conception of the sun. 
Th e current point, to repeat, is that Ramsey sentence  can capture the psychologi-
cal reality of any concepts that do exhibit the kind of features suggested in the 
Kripkean, Putnamian, and Burgean challenges; it is a separate question which 
concepts exhibit which of these features. 
 * * * 
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 A fi nal feature of Ramsey sentences that emerges from the already existing litera-
ture pertains to an alleged conditional structure in some of our concepts (Bealer, 
 1998 ; Hawthorne,  2002 ; Korman,  2006 ). Consider our concept of life. It man-
ages to refer even though it turns out that nothing has the kind of vital forces the 
vitalists of yore posited. Th ere is a cluster of functions or capacities that appear 
to distinguish animate from inanimate objects— metabolism, reproduction, 
homeostasis, and so on— and the concept  life refers to whatever exhibits suffi  -
ciently many of these. At the same time, if there  were vital forces, these capacities 
would be rather irrelevant, and  life would just refer to whatever has the vital 
forces. In other words, our concept of life exhibits a certain  conditional stratifi ca-
tion : if there are vital forces, then  life picks out whatever has vital forces, and if 
there are no vital forces, then  life picks out whatever has (suffi  ciently many of) 
the relevant capacities. 25  
 Within the Ramsifi cation framework, this conditional structure can be cap-
tured as follows. In the fi rst place, we formulate a Lewis sentence L 1  on the 
assumption that there  are vital forces. Next, we formulate a Lewis sentence L 2  
on the assumption that there are no vital forces. Finally, we construct a “mega- 
Lewis sentence” for  life , which specifi es that for any  x , if  x satisfi es L 1 , then  x 
is alive, and alive in virtue of satisfying L 1 , and if  x does not satisfy L 1  but does 
satisfy L 2 , then  x is alive, and alive in virtue of satisfying L 2 . 
 Note that every Lewis sentence can be turned into a mega- Lewis sentence by 
introducing priority relations among its disjuncts— by imposing, that is, a con-
ditional stratifi cation. Th is device has the potential to handle many cases where 
more than one entity satisfi es the Lewis sentence. If in the Lewis sentence for 
some concept C, entity E 1  satisfi es disjunct D 1  but E 2  satisfi es D 2 , it does not yet 
follow that C has “divided reference.” It may be that C works in such a way that if 
anything satisfi es D 1 , than it is the unique referent of C, but if nothing does, then 
whatever satisfi ed D 2  is. (Th is can be reiterated indefi nitely, so a whole hierarchy 
of potential referents is formed.) If so, we can turn C’s Lewis sentence into a 
mega- Lewis sentence by “conditionally stratifying” it. At the same time, some 
concepts really do have divided reference, and those would be better modeled 
by a Lewis rather than a mega- Lewis sentence. 26  
 Th e considerable fl exibility of (mega- )Lewis sentences means that it is rela-
tively hard for them to come out false— harder than it is for a simple Ramsey 
sentence, certainly. Th is will handle many cases in which folk concepts refer 
successfully even though the folk associate many false platitudes with them. For 
example, it explains why the pre- Linnaeus folk concept of a dolphin referred 
even though the folk associated with it the platitude “Th e dolphin is a fi sh.” At 
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the same time, some concepts really are empty, and when they are, their corre-
sponding (mega- )Lewis sentences should come out false. For example, whatever 
else is true of the Lewis sentence for  ghost , it should involve no disjunct which 
something in the world satisfi es. 
 In conclusion, many of our concepts may be much more complex and fl ex-
ible than traditional conceptual analysts have assumed, but this in itself does not 
show that concepts cannot be analyzed through Ramsey sentences. It is just that 
our Ramsey sentences need to be agile enough to capture the fl exible psycho-
logical structure of our concepts. Th ey acquire their agility through at least six 
devices: (1) adding deferential platitudes, (2) adding causal platitudes, (3) add-
ing perceptual platitudes, (4) rigidifying, (5) forsaking simple conjunctions for 
disjunctions- of- conjunctions, and (6) conditional stratifi cation. 27  In all proba-
bility, there are in fact other logical properties of Ramsey sentences that capture 
other psychological properties of the structure of concepts. 
 It might be objected that the envisaged Ramsey sentences are so complex 
that they could not possibly capture something psychologically real in us. 
Surely we are not aware of such immense subtlety in our concepts as is sug-
gested by the above picture. However, this complaint seems to suppose that 
we have considerable fi rst- person awareness of the structure of our concepts. 
But if this were the case, there would be no need for  analysis of concepts. To 
analyze something is to identify its components and their interrelations. Th is 
kind of activity is only needed where the components of an item and their inter-
relations are not already known. From this perspective, discovering the struc-
ture of our concepts— analyzing them— is akin to discovering the grammar of 
one’s native tongue. One can master that grammar perfectly without having any 
explicit knowledge of the rules of that grammar. It is the grammarian’s job to 
 make explicit the rules implicit in our grammatical knowledge- how, and it is 
similarly the conceptual analyst’s job to  make explicit the structure our concepts 
already implicitly have. 
 4.  Experimental philosophy as labor- intensive 
conceptual analysis 
 In  section 2 , I laid out Jackson’s program of serious metaphysics, clarifying the 
role it assigns to conceptual analysis in linking fundamental and derivative 
truths and addressing the “reduction or elimination” question about the puta-
tive referents of notions that do not appear in the fundamental truths. In  section 
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3 , I tried to show just how complex serious conceptual analysis is. I now want 
to show that serious conceptual analysis within serious metaphysics provides a 
novel rationale for x- phi. I present the essentials of the idea in  section 4.1 , then 
defend it against objections in  section 4.2 . 
 4.1  Th e labor- intensity rationale for experimentalization 
 A rigidifi ed mega- Lewis sentence with deferential, causal, and perceptual plati-
tudes, as well as a great variety of other platitudes arranged in an extraordinar-
ily complex logical structure— that is a far cry from “bachelor = def  unmarried 
man.” Th e precise structure of such a mega- Lewis sentence is not readily uncov-
ered from the armchair. While the broad contours of a concept such as  Sun , 
 wheel, or  game may be detected from the armchair by a suffi  ciently inven-
tive and industrious philosopher, obtaining the exhaustive list of relevant plati-
tudes, arranging those into the correct disjunction of conjunctions, and fi guring 
out whether a conditional stratifi cation and/ or a rigidifi cation are needed is an 
unmanageable task for a solitary armchair- bound conceptual analyst. 
 Th e great majority of concepts, I  suspect, are such as to require extraordi-
narily complex Ramsey sentences to capture. Producing the kind of Ramsey 
sentence that would refl ect correctly their structure is a sort of  labor- intensive 
conceptual analysis . My suggestion is that the rationale for experimentaliza-
tion is the need for this kind of labor- intensive conceptual analysis. Given the 
complexity of most of our concepts, capturing their psychological structure in 
full detail would require a multitude of teams of researchers working in paral-
lel to (a) produce hypotheses about aspects of Ramsey sentences, (b) devise the 
thought experiments that could test those hypotheses, and (c)  implement the 
tests through the familiar social- psychology- style questionnaires presented to 
the right kinds of subject. (It is an open question who the  right subject is, given 
the performance/ competence distinction harped on in  section 1 . To my mind, at 
least, it is doubtful that the average, relatively disengaged undergraduate student 
is it. More on this later.) 
 Producing hypotheses about aspects of Ramsey sentences that fully capture a 
concept’s psychological structure— step (a) of the procedure— is already labor- 
intensive in the present framework. For every concept, the following decision 
points arise: (i) does the Ramsey sentence involve causal platitudes?; (ii) does it 
involve perceptual platitudes?; (iii) does it involve deferential platitudes?; (iv) is 
the Ramsey sentence rigidifi ed?; (v) is it conditionally stratifi ed? Each of these 
represents a potential confound that a diff erent series of thought experiments 
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would have to address. But perhaps the hardest part of the task is (vi) to produce 
the exhaustive list of platitudes for a concept to begin with and (vii) to structure 
it into the right disjunction- of- conjunctions. 
 Take the aforementioned dozen platitudes regarding the sun, plus a half 
dozen perceptual, causal, and deferential platitudes. Ideally, to fully investigate 
what it takes for something to qualify as the sun, we would want to know for 
 each possible combination of these eighteen platitudes whether satisfying  it is suf-
fi cient for qualifying as the sun. For each combination, then, we would want to 
create a(n accessible) vignette that puts in concrete form a scenario in which just 
that combination of platitudes is satisfi ed. Note now two striking facts: (1) given 
18 platitudes, the number of possible combinations of them is 262,143; (2) the 
real number of platitudes associated with the sun is surely much greater than 18, 
and probably goes well into the hundreds. And we have not yet addressed the 
issues of rigidifi cation and conditional stratifi cation! Th us generating the total 
questionnaire and presenting it just to oneself would already be an excessive 
amount of work, and in any case the resulting task would be too hard for a single 
subject (concentration will break down, exhaustion will set it, etc.). Diff erent 
groups of subjects would probably have to be tested for diff erent fragments of 
some approximation of the real Ramsey sentence for  Sun , with the results syn-
thesized by the theorist. 
 Th e point is that fi guring out the actual, correct,  full Ramsey sentence for 
 Sun would probably swallow the entire career of a solitary armchair- bound 
conceptual analyst. What would be needed is rather a considerable  team (with 
considerable resources) working together to produce questionnaires with some 
effi  ciency, then “delegating” the production of intuitions on concrete cases pre-
sented in the questionnaires (intuition- harvesting, we may call this) to experi-
mental subjects. Effi  ciency in producing a questionnaire would be a matter of 
a priori elimination of certain combinations of platitudes not worth consider-
ing, having hunches (at “pre- trial,” so to speak) on which platitudes are most 
central and whose interrelations are most in need of examination, and so on. 
Effi  ciency in the administration of the questionnaire would be a matter of fi nd-
ing the right groups of subjects, fi nding low- cost access to such subjects (as in 
SurveyMonkey), and so on. Th ese are hallmarks of experimental research. 
 * * * 
 On the line of thought I am sketching out, we did not in fact need the experi-
mental part of Knobe’s paper on the concept  intentional action . Th e Knobe 
Eff ect is detectable from the armchair, as can be seen from the fact that most 
readers of Knobe’s paper have had the majoritarian intuitions about Knobe’s 
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vignettes. In contrast, which disjuncts of the Ramsey sentence for  Sun feature 
“Th e sun rises in the East” as a conjunct is something that would be tremen-
dously hard to detect from the armchair. Th e point is that while there may 
be concepts for which armchair- bound conceptual analysis can produce the 
full Ramsey sentence, most concepts are unlike that and require more labor- 
intensive research. 
 At the same time, even for those a (potentially sometimes substantial) frag-
ment of the Ramsey sentences may be obtainable from the armchair. Indeed, 
some core features of a Ramsey sentence— its least negotiable platitudes, its 
shortest disjuncts, whether it is rigidifi ed— are arguably reproducible from 
the armchair. It is the fi ner details of the Ramsey sentence— its most marginal 
platitudes, its lengthier disjuncts, the nuances of its logical structure— that are 
most likely to be elusive from the armchair. 28  Th is may invite the question: why 
should we bother with experimental conceptual analysis at all? 29  We can see 
why by appreciating the likely relevance of experimental conceptual analysis for 
Jackson’s serious metaphysics, in particular for the choice between reduction 
and elimination for various putative non- fundamental entities. On the reason-
able assumption that suns are not fundamental entities, are there nonetheless 
suns in our world as described in terms of its fundamental entities? Th at is, are 
sun existentials entailed by the fundamental truths? We cannot decide this with-
out a clear grasp of what is involved in there being a sun. Even if we have a full 
theory of what exists expressed in fundamental notions, we still need to know 
whether some of what exists qualifi es as a sun. And for this we need an analysis 
of the concept of a sun. Now, it is perfectly possible that in many cases the ques-
tion of reduction or elimination can be answered by considering a core fragment 
of a concept’s full Ramsey sentence, one potentially obtainable from the arm-
chair. But presumably, for many concepts answering the question of reduction 
or elimination will require the full Ramsey sentence, or at least a gigantic frag-
ment of it— one unlikely to be obtainable from the armchair. 
 For example, the fact that we are rather confi dent, without leaving the arm-
chair, that some of what there is qualifi es as a sun, suggests that the armchair- 
obtainable fragment of  Sun suffi  ces to come down on reduction. Th e fact that 
we are likewise confi dent that none of what there is qualifi es as miasma suggests 
that the armchair- obtainable fragment of  miasma suffi  ces to come down on 
elimination. But some cases appear to elude resolution from the armchair. Given 
how the world is at the fundamental level, is there such a thing as free will? Here 
reduction and elimination are both live options, and one antecedently plausible 
diagnosis— not the only one, by any means, but quite a promising one all the 
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same— is that the concept of freedom (free action as well as free decision) is so 
complex that nothing we have uncovered so far suffi  ces to resolve the reduction- 
or- elimination question. 30  
 My suggestion, then, is that the need for experimentalization arises as follows. 
First of all, certain questions of serious metaphysics require conceptual analysis 
to answer: it is impossible to establish whether certain non- fundamental state-
ments are true, notably existentials invoking notions absent in all fundamental 
truths, without conceptual analysis of the relevant notions. However, the psy-
chological reality of our concepts is a lot messier than early conceptual analysts 
had realized. In particular, concepts’ structure typically cannot be captured in 
a simple defi nition with a small number of severally necessary and conjointly 
suffi  cient conditions. Rather, an extraordinarily complex Ramsey sentence is 
required, requiring labor- intensive conceptual analysis to formulate. Crucially, 
the complexity of the Ramsey sentence oft en exceeds what can be reproduced 
from the armchair. Sometimes an armchair- reproducible fragment of the 
Ramsey sentence may suffi  ce for the reduction/ elimination adjudication, but 
plausibly, sometimes experimentalization becomes inevitable for settling the 
question of reduction or elimination. 
 4.2  Objections and replies 
 It may be objected that the labor- intensity rationale for experimentalization 
does not overcome the problem that arises around the performance/ competence 
distinction. Th at problem attended other proposed rationales discussed in  sec-
tion 1 , but labor- intensive conceptual analysis would face the same problem. 
 In response, I agree that labor- intensity by itself does not address the perfor-
mance/ competence gap. Th at issue must be addressed independently. One way 
to address it is to designate philosophers as the competent intuiters and run one’s 
surveys with large groups of philosopher- subjects. Th is would already be much 
more effi  cient than writing a whole paper about some thought experiments, 
submitting it to journals, getting it published, and then seeing whether the phil-
osophical community at large tends to converge on the expected intuition(s). 
Another way to address the performance/ competence gap is through appeal 
to non- philosophers who are not entirely naïve either. Early introspectionists 
such as Wundt and Titchner required subjects to undergo a set number of tri-
als before being considered competent introspectors; a similar device, perhaps 
more nuanced, could be used to “train up” competent intuiters, that is, sub-
jects enjoying special facility with thought experiments, outlandish scenarios, 
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counterfactual reasoning about them, and so on. Perhaps simply raising the 
stakes for undergraduates, so that they are properly engaged with the question, 
say by promising them (misleadingly) a non- trivial payment if “they get the 
right answer,” would enhance the quality of results. Coff ee, relaxing atmosphere, 
the right time of day, a light intellectual warm- up before the real questionnaire— 
all these may enhance quality and do something to address the performance/ 
competence gap. What matters for our purposes is that these ways of addressing 
the gap are  compatible with the labor- intensity rationale for experimentalization. 
In contrast, the rationale that appealed to a potential discrepancy between phi-
losophers’ and folk intuitions to justify experimentalization, for example, seems 
only to aggravate the challenge presented by the performance/ competence gap. 
 Another objection might be that many of our concepts are simply incoherent— 
or just include confl icting “streaks”— so that a Ramsey sentence that described 
them fully would have to be incoherent as well. In this circumstance, it is more 
natural to think of philosophy’s job as not just to expose the structure of our 
concepts but also to “reform” or “stabilize” them— essentially, to replace them 
with similar but coherent concepts. If so, exposing incoherencies and internal 
tensions in our everyday concepts is also part of experimental philosophy’s 
contribution. 
 My response is twofold. First, I am very skeptical of claims that folk concepts 
are oft en incoherent. Th ere is a sense in which they may have diff erent streaks 
in tension, but these more likely work together within a complex structure. For 
example, certain thought experiments may bring out a streak in our concept 
of life that privileges reference to vital forces, others reference to a cluster of 
capacities. Th is may superfi cially seem like an incoherence, but upon careful 
examination may turn out to fi t within a perfectly coherent but conditionally 
stratifi ed concept. In general, it may well be common that among the platitudes 
associated with a concept C, we might fi nd both  p and ~ p ; but presumably these 
will be insulated from each other within the overall logical structure of the Lewis 
sentence for C ( p will be a conjunct in some disjuncts of the Lewis sentence, 
while ~ p will be a conjunct in other disjuncts). It is very hard to make sense of 
the idea of an incoherent yet serviceable concept. More plausibly, then, appar-
ently confl icting streaks in a concept cohabit consistently within the concept’s 
complex logical structure. To that extent, demonstrating the incoherence or 
instability of a concept requires much more than just bringing out apparently 
confl icting streaks; it also requires falsifying or disconfi rming hypotheses about 
the concept’s structure that would reconcile the apparently confl icting streaks in 
a complex (mega- )Lewis sentence. 31  
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 Secondly, although some x- phi research clearly attempts to demonstrate the 
incoherence or instability of folk concepts, this research is better thought of as 
part of x- phi’s  negative program. As noted in  section 1 , however, my goal in this 
paper is only to identify a rationale for x- phi’s positive program. I readily confess 
that nothing about the project of serious metaphysics, and the role it assigns to 
conceptual analysis, rationalizes experimental research within x- phi’s  negative 
program. 
 A third objection is that while  some concepts have the kind of extraordinarily 
complex structure that can only be fully tackled with experimentalist effi  ciency, 
this is not the case for the kinds of concept philosophers tend to be interested 
in. Th e concepts  knowledge ,  reference , or  proposition , for example, are 
not going to require a rigidifi ed conditionally stratifi ed enormous disjunction of 
enormous conjunctions to capture. 
 However, it is actually very possible that a full and accurate capture of 
 knowledge would require quite a complicated Ramsey sentence. One pos-
sible diagnosis of the post- Gettier literature on the analysis of knowledge might 
be that it has been hampered by excessive allegiance to the hope that a com-
pact number of severally necessary and conjointly suffi  cient conditions could 
fully capture the concept of knowledge. We just need to be more creative: add 
a fourth condition to JBT (Lehrer & Paxson,  1969 ), replace J with a reliabil-
ity condition (Goldman,  1967 ), or some such. In a recent paper, Sosa ( 2009 ) 
appears to off er an eight- condition analysis of “S knows full well that  p .” 32  I sus-
pect this more expansive account still grossly underestimates the internal com-
plexity of  knowledge . One can only speculate here, but it may well be that 
the atmosphere of general dissatisfaction with the deliverances of the literature 
on the analysis of knowledge will not dissipate until a more labor- intensive 
approach to the concept is deliberately taken. It could  also turn out, of course, 
that despite initial appearances,  knowledge succumbs to relatively straight-
forward analysis. Arguably, this turned out to be the case, contra Wittgenstein, 
with the concept  game , which I take to have already been analyzed satis-
factorily in terms of four independently necessary and conjointly suffi  cient 
conditions (Suits,  1978 ). In any case, as long as we do not actually possess a 
satisfactory analysis of some concept philosophers are interested in, as appears 
to be the case with  knowledge , it remains an open possibility that the reason 
is that we have underestimated the concept’s complexity; that would already 
justify pursuing experimental conceptual analysis alongside armchair concep-
tual analysis. In any case, I fully recognize that the role I am assigning here to 
x- phi is relatively limited. To that extent, my position is intermediate between 
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the revolutionary zeal of some x- phi proponents and the dismissive disdain of 
some x- phi opponents. 
 Let me close with fi nal comments on the potential charge, already discussed 
in  section 3 , that the various devices therein used to accommodate Kripkean, 
Putnamian, and Burgean insights fail to get us beyond the  descriptive content of 
concepts— whereas the whole point of Kripke, Putnam, and Burge was that there 
is more to a concept’s semantic profi le than its descriptive content. Clearly, this 
is not the place to litigate issues of descriptivism versus direct reference, seman-
tic internalism versus externalism, and so on. As noted, however, even if there 
is more to a concept than its descriptive content, it is the concept’s descriptive 
component that lends itself to informative analysis. Accordingly, it is in virtue 
of its descriptive content that the concept plays a role in serious metaphysics. 
Importantly, if there are concepts that  have no descriptive content, and simply 
refer to whatever causes their tokenings (say), then arguably the question of 
reduction or elimination  does not arise for their putative referents. Since some-
thing certainly causes tokenings of C, it is trivial that C has a referent, and there-
fore that reductivism rather than eliminativism is true of C’s referent. 33  Indeed, it 
is this reasoning that convinced Stich to forsake his original eliminativism about 
belief and desire (see Jackson,  2009 ; Stich, 1979). Now, if  all concepts were of this 
sort, then conceptual analysis would indeed disappear from serious metaphys-
ics, and reductivism would be the right view about  all non- fundamentals. But 
we already know that this cannot be: some concepts  are empty ( phlogiston, 
miasma, ghost ,  Escher triangle , etc.). So we know that some concepts 
refer at least partly via a descriptive content, which unfortunately is not always 
satisfi ed by something. 34  For such concepts’ putative referents, the question of 
reduction or elimination arises, and conceptual analysis— potentially with an 
experimental component— is inevitable for deciding the question. 35  
 Conclusion: A place under the sun 
 A fi nal objection may be that my proposed rationale for experimental philoso-
phy places the latter squarely within a very traditional, conservative conception 
of philosophy. Th is might not suit the self- conception of x- phi practitioners, 
who tend to paint experimental philosophy in more revolutionary colors. Some 
of them may well consider Jackson’s project downright reactionary. 
 In response, I can only confess that my proposed rationale for x- phi embeds 
it in a very traditional conception of the philosophical project. Th is is by design. 
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For reasons I cannot go into here (but see Kriegel,  2016 ), I consider the project 
Jackson articulates as the core project of philosophy. Seeking a total theory of 
the world in terms of a privileged subset of fundamental notions, and then fi nd-
ing the place (if any) of putative non- fundamentals in it— that is the project we 
fi nd from the Eleatics and Aristotle through Aquinas, Spinoza, and Brentano to 
Lewis, Sider, and Schaff er. Aristotle designated Th ales as the fi rst philosopher— 
Th ales, who instructed that everything was water! What makes this a piece of 
philosophy, however disappointing? Th e answer is that Th ales’s thesis “is dis-
criminatory, and it claims completeness.” More specifi cally, it cites only water 
truths in its theory of everything, but claims that nothing in the world is left  
unaccounted for by these water truths. Th e central thread of the history of phi-
losophy, as I see it, is the search for improvements on Th ales’s theory— theories 
both complete and discriminatory that are just  better than Th ales’s. Obviously, 
I have not argued for this here. But from my perspective, the best way to rat-
ify the status of x- phi as genuine philosophy (as opposed to cognitive science 
performed by academics whose tenure home is a philosophy department) is to 
identify a role for x- phi within this traditional project originating with Th ales. 
And indeed, I have claimed that x- phi does have a role within this core project of 
philosophy, albeit a somewhat limited one: x- phi provides supplementation and 
intensifi cation of methods for pursuing a component of this project (the com-
ponent pertaining to analysis of concepts), which intensifi cation may sometimes 
be needed to settle the status of non- fundamentals in the theory. 
 On this view, the methodological innovations of x- phi— at least as far as 
its positive program is concerned— pertain not to intellectual  ends , but to the 
 means for pursuing already entrenched ends. In this respect, armchair concep-
tual analysis and x- phi are far from rivals; on the contrary, they complement 
each other in pursuit of a common goal (Jackson,  2008 ,  2011 ). 36  
 Notes 
  1  Th is is certainly more plausible than the hypothesis that their concept of intentional 
action is diff erent from yours and mine and  lacks the normative aspect Knobe claims 
yours and mine have. 
  2  A concept’s extension is the set of worldly items that fall under it; its intension, very 
roughly and to a very fi rst approximation, is the “general rule” for its application. 
Th e concept  bachelor ’s intension is something like “anything that is an unmarried 
man” and its extension is the collection of bachelors. 
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  3  It might be objected that for Gettier, writing his paper was not the fi rst step in 
conducting an empirical test. Whatever testing was involved in Gettier’s process, 
it was over by the time Gettier wrote and published the article. Th e purpose of 
writing and publishing the article was to  let us know that there are counterexamples 
to JBT— not to  check whether there are such. However, from the perspective of 
the community of inquiry, nothing was established simply by Gettier thinking 
up scenarios and intuiting about them. It is only because Gettier’s scenarios and 
intuitions were  so good , and produced immediate and predictable assent in the 
community at large, that Gettier could write up his paper with the confi dent 
purpose of just  letting us know something. 
  4  According to Google Scholar, Gettier’s paper has been cited almost 2000 times. 
Oversimplifying a lot for the sake of drama, one could boldly assert on this basis 
that Gettier’s pool of  relevant subjects is in fact considerably larger than Knobe’s. 
  5  Th is point is related to the so- called expertise defense of traditional armchair 
conceptual analysis (Kauppinen,  2007 ; Williamson,  2011 ). 
  6  Another is that philosophers usually consider both of Knobe’s scenarios, whereas 
experimental subjects are provided with only one of them. In general, social- 
psychology- style experiments in which subjects are presented with contrasts yield 
diff erent results than ones in which subjects are divided into groups each of which 
is presented with only one side of the theorist’s intended contrast. (Th anks to Brent 
Strickland for pointing this out to me.) 
  7  More generally, although one can imagine an experimental study revealing 
to philosopher readers the error of their ways, it is harder to imagine the 
study doing this  solely by laying out folk intuitions that manifestly diff er from 
philosophers’ intuitions. In saying “solely,” I want to rule out here cases in which 
a study involves an ingenious new thought experiment that philosophers had not 
previously considered, or raises substantive considerations that philosophers had 
previously failed to appreciate. For those elements do not go to the study’s status 
as experimental and could be integrated into any piece of traditional armchair 
philosophy. 
  8  I have personally engaged in translations from French and German to English and 
from English to Hebrew and can attest that the phenomenology of the non- identity 
of translating and translated words is very stark. 
  9  Th e reasons to adopt a principle of charity in this area are the same as the 
reasons to adopt the principle of charity in interpretation in general: (a) there are 
transcendental rationality constraints on the understanding of others (Davidson, 
 1974 ) and (b) there are evolutionary pressures to weed out incoherent concepts, 
irrational beliefs, and so on (Dennett,  1987 ). 
  10  Of course, an alternative reaction to the truth- insensitivity fi ndings is to dismiss 
 instinctual verdicts on thought- experimental scenarios and replace them with 
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 considered verdicts in the study of concepts— verdicts formed aft er suitable 
refl ection, including philosophical refl ection. 
  11  It may still have something  indirectly to do with philosophy, insofar as philosophers 
can and oft en do appeal to empirical science, including social psychology (of which 
x- phi is a branch), to inform their treatment of traditional philosophical problems. 
  12  I am assuming here that there is some substantive essence to philosophy. Just as 
the “institutional theory of art” claims that what makes an object a piece of art is 
simply the fact that it is in a museum, one could paddle an “institutional theory of 
philosophy” according to which what makes a bit of inquiry philosophy is that it 
is performed by people salaried by philosophy departments. I am assuming here 
that this is false. One counterexample to it is Plato, who was not salaried by any 
philosophy department, but whose work is philosophical; obviously, there are many 
others. 
  13  I develop my take on the matter in Kriegel ( 2016 ). 
  14  I use “statement” as conveniently ambiguous between proposition and sentence, 
and “notion” as conveniently ambiguous between concept and word. In either 
reading, a notion is a constituent of a statement. 
  15  Essentially the same project is developed in greater detail in David Chalmers’s 
 Constructing the World (2012). Chalmers goes beyond Jackson in  arguing for the 
central presupposition of serious metaphysics, namely, that  there exists a small 
group of truths from which all others can be derived. In addition, for Chalmers 
the relationship between fundamental and derivative truths is that of “scrutability,” 
where “ p is scrutable from  q ” means that the conjunction of  q and all a priori truths 
deductively entail  p . 
  16  Tautologies using derivative notions, such as “Every policeman is a policeman” may 
still be entailed by the fundamental truths, but non- tautological statements with 
derivative notions will not. 
  17  Existentials are in some respects the most basic non- fundamental statements 
requiring conceptual analysis to assess the truth of (given the fundamental truths). 
For other statements invoking a non- fundamental notion N will typically entail 
existentials in which the existence of N’s referent or extension will be claimed. 
  18  Observe that the example, which will follow us through much of the paper, 
concerns  the sun and not  a sun. Accordingly, I label the concept  Sun (upper- case 
“s”) rather than  sun (lower- case “s”). 
  19  In other words, the  Merriam- Webster Ramsey sentence is as follows: ( Sun MW  ) Th ere 
is a (single)  x , such that  x is the luminous celestial body, around  x revolve the earth 
and other planets, from  x the planets receive heat and light,  x is composed mainly 
of hydrogen and helium,  x has a mean distance from earth of about 93,000,000 
miles (150,000,000 km),  x has a linear diameter of 864,000 miles (1,390,000 km), 
and  x has a mass 332,000 times greater than earth. 
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  20  Quine’s picture of how concepts work thus diff ers from the traditional descriptivist 
picture along two dimensions. First, in lieu of the dichotomy between fully 
nonnegotiable and fully negotiable statements about Cs, it off ers a gradient model in 
which statements about Cs vary in their degree of negotiability (or revisability) along 
a spectrum. Secondly, in Quine’s model there are no fully nonnegotiable statements 
about Cs— no convictions whose degree of revisability is strictly zero. (One might 
have proposed that concepts work like dimmer lights: once they are on, they have 
degrees of brightness, but they can also be completely off , with the diff erence between 
“on” and “off ” being binary and determinate. But in Quine’s model there is no “off ” 
mode for negotiability: there are only degrees of brightness in the “on” mode.) 
  21  At the same time, reference failure may result from suffi  ciently many relatively 
marginal platitudes turning out to be false. Still, it is a measure of a platitude’s 
centrality that its weight is such as to induce reference failure in conspiracy with 
relatively few other falsifi ed platitudes. Th e falsifi cation of “Th e sun is more or 
less spherical” would have to be combined with more similar instances than the 
falsifi cation of “Th e sun is extremely hot” to results in  Sun failing to refer (i.e., 
turning out to be an empty concept). 
  22  I say “most” because in the case imagined  at least eight platitudes needed to be true, 
which means that some disjuncts have more than eight conjuncts in them. 
  23  One might also imagine deferential platitudes that defer not to the current experts, 
but to something like the end- of- inquiry experts. If there is this kind of deferential 
dimension in some concepts, it would explain why those concepts can co- refer 
before and aft er scientifi c revolutions. 
  24  Th e moral I would draw from the discussion of these three challenges is that 
although diff erent individuals’ concepts of the sun may be modeled by diff erent 
Ramsey sentences, communication between these individuals is nonetheless 
possible because, and to the extent that, there is suffi  cient  overlap among the 
Ramsey sentences that capture their respective concepts. Crucially, diff erent 
individuals probably share perceptual, causal, and deferential platitudes, and 
typically also a number of other convictions about the sun. Furthermore, for many 
concepts, the Kripkean causal platitude and the Putnamian perceptual platitudes 
are highly central, perhaps even nonnegotiable: they appear in most or all disjuncts 
of the relevant Lewis sentence.  Sun is a case in point. If “Th e sun is that of which 
I seem to be perceptually aware when I have my sun- experiences” turns out to be 
false, my concept of sun may well be empty aft er all. If so, this platitude should 
show up in every disjunct of the Lewis sentence for my sun concept. Plausibly, now, 
the analogous platitude will appear in every disjunct of the Lewis sentence for my 
interlocutor’s sun concept. Th is kind of core overlap undergirds communication. 
  25  Hawthorne and Braddon- Mitchell apply this to the concept  consciousness , 
with the thought that it works a bit like the concept  life :  if there is a primitive, 
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irreducible property of consciousness, then  consciousness picks out it, but 
if there is none, then  consciousness picks out a cluster of functional feature 
associated with conscious states. Th is is supposed to show that the conceivability of 
zombies is perfectly compatible with physicalism about consciousness. 
  26  As a general rule, it is important to keep in mind that it is not the Ramsifi cation’s 
job to tell us what is intuitive— only to capture whatever psychological structure 
emerges from what we deem intuitive. I will return to this point in  section 4 . 
  27  It does not follow, however, that every concept’s structure is correctly described by 
a rigidifi ed mega- Lewis sentence with deferential, causal, and perceptual platitudes. 
Rigidifi cation, for example, is relevant only to Twin- Earthable concepts; concepts 
such as  friend are not Twin- Earthable, and therefore do not call for rigidifi cation. 
Meanwhile, concepts such as  bachelor are rather fl at and structureless, and so do 
not call for the prioritization characterizing mega- Lewis sentences. Nor do  friend , 
 bachelor , or  cup call for deferential or perceptual platitudes (there seem to be no 
recognized friendship experts to whom the lay implicitly defer and no perceptual 
acquaintance needed to be competent with these concepts). 
  28  I leave it open whether every fragment of the Ramsey sentence for  Sun could 
 in principle be detected from the armchair, though they could not  all be, or 
whether there are fragments so intricate that experimentalization is necessary to 
uncover them. 
  29  A traditionalist armchair philosopher might argue that my proposed rationale for 
experimentalization only underscores the insignifi cance of x- phi, as it calls on the 
latter only for the fi ner, less central details of concepts. Th ere are a priori reasons 
to suspect that this cannot be quite right. Philosophy of science used to be in the 
business of telling scientists what they do wrong. Modern philosophy of science 
has wisely restricted itself to trying to understand why science works the way it 
does, rather than trying to reform it. One suspects that the same humble approach 
would suit the “philosophy of philosophy.” Clearly, x- phi is a fl ourishing research 
program. So our fi rst priority should be to understand what contributions it makes 
to research that sustain its fl ourishing. (One could alternatively go for sociological 
explanations in terms of changing fashions, of course, but this seems rightly 
thought of as a last- resort explanation.) 
  30  Another diagnosis is that our empirical knowledge about the world at the 
fundamental level is insuffi  cient to come down on reduction or elimination of free 
will. Th is second diagnosis does not seem more antecedently plausible. Indeed, it 
seems to me antecedently less plausible. 
  31  Note that however many such hypotheses we would falsify, charity would exhort us 
to seek others before adopting the thesis that the concept is incoherent. 
  32  Sosa’s analysis, if I have understood it correctly, is this: S knows full well that  p iff  
(i) S believes that  p , (ii) S’s belief that  p is true, (iii) S’s belief that  p is competently 
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held, (iv) it is the case that (ii) because it is the case that (iii) (read: S’s belief that  p 
is apt), (v) S’s decision to make a judgment on whether  p is correct (i.e., is the right 
decision), (vi) S’s decision to make a judgment on whether  p is competent, (vii) it 
is the case that (v) because it is the case that (vi) (read: S’s belief that  p is meta- apt), 
and (viii) it is the case that (iv) because it is the case that (vi). Th is is complicated by 
the standard of armchair conceptual analysis, but is very “clean” as compared to the 
kind of meta- Lewis sentence I suspect our concept of the sun would require. 
  33  It is a separate question whether the referent is a homogeneous kind or property, on 
the one hand, or a “wildly disjunctive” one on the other; but either way there will be 
a cause. 
  34  When I say a concept refers  partly via a description, I mean that the description at 
least puts constraints on the kinds of thing that are eligible referents of the concept. 
Th at thesis would always be a last- resort view. 
  35  Th ere is also the view, of course, that  all concepts involve such a descriptive 
component, or at least that there is  a notion of reference that is determined in part 
by descriptive content (Jackson,  2009 ). 
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